Since Russia invaded Ukraine in February of 2022, thousands of Ukrainian children have been forcibly transferred from Ukraine to Russia and Russian-controlled territory.1 Many of these children have been adopted by Russian families and become Russian citizens. Russia has stated that these are “evacuations” done for humanitarian purposes and claimed that the adoptions are done to save Ukrainian “orphans.”2 In reality, many if not most of these children have parents who are very much alive and want them back.3 However, there are numerous challenges that these parents face when they attempt to do so. One of these challenges is the difficulty locating the children at all, due to a lack of records showing who went where.4 Another is the barrier that Ukrainian parents face territorially and financially, as many of them are required to go to Russia or Russian-controlled territory in order to retrieve their child.5 Additionally, there is the challenge that some children, having been given pro-Russia propaganda, do not want to return to Ukraine.6
In March of 2023, the International Criminal Court (ICC) charged President Vladimir Putin and Maria Lvova-Belova, his children’s rights commissioner, with the war crimes of unlawful deportation and unlawful transfer of population (children) from Ukraine.7 It has been eight months since the ICC issued arrest warrants for Putin and Lvova-Belova, yet no arrests have been made and the issue is ongoing.
Because the ICC does not have its own police force, it must rely on countries that are party to the Rome Statute to enforce its arrest warrants.8 It is fair to expect that Putin and Lvova- Belova will not be arrested for two reasons. First, Russia is not a party to the Rome Statute, which established the ICC, so Putin and Lvova-Belova will not be arrested by their own country.9 Second, they are unlikely to travel to a different country that has agreed to the Statute; it is also unlikely that, if they did do so, any of those countries would be willing to arrest them and deal with the controversy that would come with taking such action.10
However, this does not mean that the ICC’s arrest warrants are simply symbolic or just a slap-on-the-wrist. In fact, there is evidence that suggests that the arrest warrants were influential in getting Russia to return some of the children.11 The arrest warrants were a good start to holding Russia responsible, and sanctions imposed on Russia since then have put an increasing amount of pressure on Russia in this conflict, but there is more work to be done.12 This paper argues that it is not the ICC, but national governments and international organizations that are better able and more likely to hold Putin and Lvova-Belova accountable, and to end Russia’s forcible transfer and deportation of Ukrainian children.
Section I of this paper will provide an explanation of how the forcible deportation and transfer of Ukrainian children takes place through two separate routes, which both end in the adoption of the children into Russian families. In Section II, the paper will describe the Russification of the children – a process in which they are stripped of their Ukrainian identity – through systematic reeducation efforts to have them identify as Russians and actions taken at the Russian government’s legislative and executive levels to further this goal. Section III will summarize the ICC’s involvement thus far– primarily, the ICC’s decision to arrest warrants for Vladimir Putin and Maria Lvova-Belova for their roles in the forcible deportation and transfer of the children, as well as the impact of the ICC’s decision. Then, Section IV will describe ongoing efforts to retrieve the children and hold Russia accountable, as well as expert recommendations for further efforts. Finally, Section V of the paper will propose how the ICC, Ukraine, and other states should act going forward to achieve these goals.
The Transfer & Deportation of Ukrainian Children
In the almost two years since Russia invaded Ukraine, thousands of Ukrainian children have been removed from their homes and transferred to Russia and Russian-controlled territories. While Russia claims that this is done for the “humanitarian” purpose of protecting Ukrainian “orphans,” it is actually an organized effort to remove these children from their families and strip them of their Ukrainian identity.13 This section of the paper aims to describe the two processes of how the transfer of these children takes place, depending on which category the child belongs in.14
Process 1: Deportations and Evacuations
The first process is for children who are purported orphans.15 While some of these children are orphans, the majority of them have parents or guardians who are alive.16 Russia’s designation of “orphans” includes children who reside in Ukraine’s state institutions or who are of uncertain custody.17 Russia claims that some are simply orphans, and these children are deported to be fostered or adopted by Russian families directly.18 Others in this category are allegedly “evacuated” from Ukraine due to ‘safety concerns’ or for ‘medical care,’ according to Russia.19 They are sent to hospitals or other facilities in Russia-controlled areas and upon leaving these facilities, they are moved to family centers and ultimately fostered or adopted by Russian families as well.20
Process 2: Camps
The second process is for children with known parents or guardians; these children are sent to recreational camps in Russia, either with or without consent of the parent or guardian.21 Some children do return to their families when they are scheduled to, but many of them have suspended returns.22 Other children in these camps are completely cut off from their families, as the camp administrators restrict or forbid their communication.23 Although some of the parents consented to their children going to these camps temporarily, the Russian camp officials will keep the children there for longer without the parents consent. Sometimes, the parents are not even informed of the delay.24 These parents are often told by the camp officials that the children will not be returned to Ukraine because it is unsafe there.25 Others are told that the children will not be released unless a parent/guardian comes to pick up the child in person – a journey that is very expensive and dangerous for most Ukrainian parents to take. 26 If the parents do not come get the children in person within a certain time frame, the children are placed in Russian families’ homes to be fostered by or adopted by those families.27
After the Children are Adopted
Regardless of whichever process occurs, it is nearly impossible for the parents to retrieve their children after adoption has taken place because there is no formal system for having the children returned to Ukraine or reunited with their families.28 To make things even more difficult, Russia does not keep records of where all of the children have gone.29This is a clear violation of Article 78 of Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Convention, which requires that when a country arranges for the evacuation of children, other than its own nationals, to a foreign country, that country must facilitate the return of those children to their families and work with the Red Cross to ensure that the location of the children can be traced.30
The Russification of Ukrainian Children
Russification is the erasure of the Ukrainian childrens’ national identity and “[transformation of] their Ukrainian consciousness into Russian consciousness.” 31 In addition to the already mentioned obstacles that Ukrainian parents face when attempting to retrieve their children, Russification presents an additional problem: after being exposed to Russian propaganda, some children do not want to return home.32 This Russification occurs not only at the camps that the children are sent to, but also through placing the children into Russian families and granting them Russian citizenship.33 Russia has taken action at the executive and legislative levels to facilitate the childrens’ adoption of a Russian identity: in March of 2023, Putin instructed the Russian legislature to simplify the procedure for Russian families to adopt Ukrainian children.34 Russia has also accelerated the procedure for these children to gain Russian citizenship.35
Systematic Re-education Efforts
When the children are taken to the camps in Russia-controlled areas, they are exposed to Russia-centric academic, cultural, and patriotic education.36 The children are taught lessons in Russian, made to sing the Russian national anthem, and educated in pro-Russia version of history.37 Additionally, they are forbidden from speaking Ukrainian and forced to learn Russian instead.38 Russia has stated that the goal of this re-education system is to get the children interested in attending Russian universities in the future.39 However, it is argued that the true motivation is to brainwash the children to forget their Ukrainian identity.40 Allegedly, children in some of the camps are being exposed to military education.41 It is claimed that they are being taught how to handle military equipment, drive trucks, and use firearms.42
The re-education of these children appears to be quite effective in Russifying some children. Reporters at the New York Times have spoken to the parents of multiple children who attend these camps and have heard first-hand accounts of how their children believed the propaganda and as a result did not want to return home.43 One mother said that when she went to collect her son, he told her that life was better in Russia and that he wished to stay there with his foster family.44
Legislative and Executive Action to Support Russification
Under Russian law, it is prohibited for foreign children to be adopted without the consent of their home country. 45 But Putin signed a decree in early 2023 which made it much simpler for Russia to adopt Ukrainian children and give them Russian citizenship without the consent of Ukraine.46 In January 2024, he signed another decree which states that Ukrainian orphans and children without parental care are eligible for receiving Russian citizenship without satisfying all the requirements of federal legislation.47 Additionally, there is a financial incentive for Russian citizens to adopt the children, because “receiving Russian citizenship entitles the children to social guarantees and access to government subsidies.”48 Russian law provides that the adopted children are equal to their parents’ own children,49 which means that the adoptive parents are allowed to change the children’s names, surnames, dates of birth, and birthplaces.50 This makes it even more challenging for Ukrainian parents to find their children, as it is more difficult to identify any relatives in Ukraine or to establish the status of the adopted children.51
ICC Involvement
The International Criminal Court (ICC) was established in 1998 under the Rome Statute.
Though neither Ukraine nor Russia is party to the Rome Statute, the ICC can exercise jurisdiction over war crimes that have been committed in the conflict between Ukraine and Russia.52 This is because Ukraine, pursuant to Article 12(3) of the Rome Statute, has accepted the ad hoc jurisdiction of the Court for alleged crimes committed by Russia throughout the territory of Ukraine from February 20, 2014.53 These alleged crimes include the forcible transfer and deportation of Ukrainian children, which fall under Article 8 of the Rome Statute.
Relevant Articles of The Rome Statute
Article 8(2)(a)(vii) provides that “unlawful deportation or transfer” of persons is a war crime. The elements of the crime are:
- The perpetrator deported or transferred one more persons to another State or to another location.
- such person or persons were protected under one or more of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.
- The perpetrator was aware of the actual factual circumstances that established that protected status.
- The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed conflict.
- The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.54
Article 8(2)(b)(viii) provides that “the deportation or transfer of all or parts of the population of the occupied territory within or outside [the] territory [which is occupied by an Occupying Power]” is a war crime, as well. The elements of the crime are as follows:
- The perpetrator:
- Transferred, directly or indirectly, parts of its own population into the territory it occupies; or
- Deported or transferred all or parts of the population of the occupied territory within or outside this territory.
- The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed conflict.
- The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.55
The ICC Issues Arrest Warrants for Putin & Lvova-Belova
On March 17, 2023, the ICC issued arrest warrants for Putin and Lvova-Belova.56 This action was taken based on the ICC’s finding that there are reasonable grounds to believe that Russia’s forcible transfer and deportation of Ukrainian children constituted war crimes, as defined in Article 8(a)(2)(a)(vii) and Article 8(2)(b)(viii).57 In issuing the arrest warrant, the ICC said that Putin “bore individual criminal responsibility for the abduction and deportation of Ukrainian children since Russia’s invasion [in 2022].”58 The Court also issued the warrant for Maria Lvova-Belova as “the public face of the Kremlin-sponsored program that transfers the children out of Ukraine.”59
Nearly a year has passed since the ICC issued the arrest warrants, but no arrests have yet been made. Because the ICC has no police force, “it must rely on the cooperation of its 123 member states to enforce its warrants, something they haven’t always been willing to do.”60 While the threat of arrest limits both Putin and Lvova-Belova from traveling to member states, they are free to travel to states that are not parties to the ICC, as those states are not required to take action based on the arrest warrant.61
There are two other obstacles to their arrests. First, “even if Putin… [was] to lose power in Russia, a government that wanted to extradite him would face a major hurdle: the Russian constitution prohibits the extradition of Russian citizens to another state.”62 Second, the ICC would not try either party without first arresting them, as the Court does not conduct trials without the accused present.63 Therefore, it is very unlikely that Putin or Lvova-Belova, while Putin remains in power, will be arrested and surrendered to the ICC.64 Commentators have therefore questioned whether the ICC’s arrest warrant from March of 2023 matters.65
The Impact of the ICC’s Decision
Despite not leading to any arrests thus far, the warrants have been effective in other ways. Some speculate that it has prevented Putin from traveling.66 Additionally, by issuing the warrants and making them public, “the ICC is relying on the symbolic function of international criminal law – it is publicly naming and shaming Putin and Lvova-Belova for the commission of serious atrocities, and it is sending a message to other leaders and the international community that such actions are not without consequence.”67 The message was definitely heard by the international community, as the ICC’s decision led other countries to take action against Russia for their alleged war crimes.68 For example, in August of 2023, the U.S. State Department imposed economic sanctions against a number of “people and entities it said are reportedly connected to the forced deportation and transfer of Ukraine’s children.”69 Moreover, Ukraine has said the ICC’s arrest warrants have proved useful in getting Russia to return at least some of the deported children.70
The arrest warrants also help the victims of Russia’s actions by affording them “some form of vindication or recognition for their suffering and hope for justice in the future.”71 Additionally, the warrants have been beneficial for the ICC’s reputation, as “making the warrants public enables the ICC to reclaim itself as a key avenue for ensuring accountability for international crimes, following a wave of criticism and disenchantment about its work….”72
Despite the good that the ICC’s arrest warrants have done, there is the risk that they could interfere with the ability to enter into peace negotiations with Putin.73 Serbian President Aleksander Vucic argued that the warrants “will have bad political consequences” and create “a great reluctance to talk about peace (and) about truce” in Ukraine.74 Specifically, Russia might “use [the ICC’s decision] to raise the stakes of the war domestically and also to argue, when it wants, that any negotiations are just a smokescreen to the ultimate goal of toppling Putin.”75 It is also unlikely that the warrants have an impact on Putin domestically, aside from limiting his ability to travel, as Russian press coverage has “[described] the arrest warrant as ‘a rotten political show and corrupt, opportunistic justice in the interests of the countries of the “golden billion,” a reference to anti-Western Russian conspiracy.’”76 However, there is a potential impact on the elites supporting Putin’s maintenance of power: “the ICC warrant may complicate Putin’s position by both increasing elites’ unhappiness with him (the war crimes accusation could complicate their ability to travel freely abroad) and, as a result, by heightening his suspicion of the people around him.”77
Ongoing Efforts and Recommendations for Future Action
The ICC’s decision from last March was a good start to holding Russia accountable for the forced deportation and transfer of Ukrainian children. In addition to national governments putting pressure on Russia following the decision, ongoing efforts by groups like Save Ukraine, a charitable organization dedicated to retrieving the deported children, have been central to bringing the children back to Ukraine.78 However, there still are many who have not been returned and Russia has continued to deport and transfer even more children.79 While Kyiv says that 20,000 children have been taken from Ukraine to Russia or Russian-occupied territories,80 it is estimated that only five hundred of these children have been returned to Ukraine as of late February 2024.81 Clearly, there is much more work to be done. This section will describe ongoing efforts to hold Russia accountable and recommendations that have been made for further actions to retrieve the children.
Ongoing Efforts: Putting Pressure on Russia and EU Actions
Since the ICC’s decision back in March 2023, there has been an increase in pressure placed on Russia by national governments.82 Some of this pressure has been in the form of economic sanctions imposed on Russia.83 Notably, the European Union has imposed sanctions on 39 individuals responsible for the deportation and forced transfer of Ukrainian children.84 Additional pressure has been placed on Russia through public condemnation of these actions. In April 2023, “a ‘Joint Statement’ was signed by the EU together with 22 other states… [which] stated … that: ‘we unequivocally condemn the actions of Russia in Ukraine, in particular the forced deportation of Ukrainian children, as well as other serious violations against children committed by Russian forces in Ukraine.’”85 In June 2023, the U.S. Senate condemned Russia for these actions as well.86 In March 2024, the U.S. went even further in demonstrating its support by “[announcing] it has joined the International Coalition for the Return of Ukrainian Children as a member state to support the safe return of all Ukrainian children who have been unlawfully deported or forcibly transferred by Russia, and to ensure those responsible face consequences.”87
The arrest warrants catalyzed action at both the domestic and EU levels.88 Following the issuance of the arrest warrants, the EU has actively supported the ICC and Ukraine in their efforts to retrieve the displaced children and to hold Russia accountable.89 In addressing urgent concerns surrounding Ukrainian children forcibly deported to Russia, Dubravka Suica, Vice President of the European Commission, detailed how the EU has supported the ICC and Ukraine’s efforts and how it intends to continue doing so:
Seventeen Member States have so far opened investigations into international crimes committed in Ukraine, and the European Union is supporting these national investigations through strengthening judicial cooperation via Eurojust.
Six Member States and Ukraine are members of the joint investigation team, to which the ICC and Europol are participants….90
The EU has also supported the ICC monetarily, “with over EUR 10 million since the beginning of the invasion.”91Suica expressed the EU’s belief that “the court is a key actor for consistency and enforcement of the international criminal justice system,” and at the same time, the “EU intends to continue supporting the Prosecutor of General Office of Ukraine to strengthen its capacities to investigate and prosecute international crimes committed in Ukraine.”92 So far, this support has included the EU putting 4 million Euros toward financing the IT advancement of the Prosecutor General’s Office.93 Further, “the European Union is committed to improving the coordination of various support efforts to the Prosecutor General’s Office through the international platform of the dialogue group.”94
Recommendations for Further Action
With only five hundred of the estimated 20,000 children who were forcibly taken by Russia having been returned to Ukraine, there is much that must be done retrieve more children already in Russia or Russian-occupied territory, as well as to prevent further deportations from occurring.95 In November of 2023, a workshop was organized on behalf of the European Parliament’s Subcommittee on Human Rights (DROI). 96 At the workshop, academic experts Dr. Andreas Umland and Dr. Yulia Ioffe made recommendations for how to bring the Ukrainian children back home.97
Dr. Umland, an analyst at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, first recommended two strategies for returning the children home: “firstly, a shaming and blaming campaign, and secondly, a backchannel diplomacy initiative.”98 The backchannel diplomacy that he advocates for “would use mediators, usually non-western states, neutral non-governmental organizations (NGO), religious and labor, and other groups to bring children back from Russia to Ukraine.”99 He also recommended that the European Parliament and the European Union work by in using their connections to both governmental and non-governmental actors in Russia to identify where the children are and which ones have been forcibly deported in order to facilitate their return.100 Additionally, Dr. Umland emphasized the importance of international organizations and national governments putting international pressure on Russia in order for a radical regime change to occur; “in that regard, he endorsed the recommendations of the Regional Center for Human Rights, a major Ukrainian NGO[,]” which suggests that ad hoc parliamentary resolutions should deal with the deportation and transfer of the children specifically, “rather than having this topic included to a subcomponent to a larger resolution by a national or international body.”101 He stated that the best and most important place for this to take place would be the United Nations (UN) General Assembly.102 The Center also suggested that sanctions imposed on Russia due to their deportation and Russification of Ukrainian children should be expanded beyond their current scope.103
Recognizing that a large challenge to finding the children is the lack of records showing who went where,104 Dr. Umland emphasized that more research must be done to build a comprehensive register that documents the deported and displaced children.105 In order to prevent even more children from being taken by Russia, he also recommended that an awareness-raising campaign be created for Ukrainian families about the holiday camps so they “do not fall victim to Russian traps[.]”106
Dr. Ioffe, an Assistant Professor in Law at University College London, also stressed the importance of prevention, noting that there is no mechanism in international law for the return of children.107 She emphasized “the need for close cooperation in evidence collection, an enhanced use of universal jurisdiction, and a coordinated approach to financing.”108
In respect to Ioffe’s recommendation for an enhanced use of universal jurisdiction, it has been suggested that other states should “pursue accountability for the forcible transfer of Ukrainian children at the national level pursuant to the principle of universal jurisdiction” to “[be part of the solution to addressing the … atrocities committed in Ukraine.”109So far, four states – Germany, Sweden, Lithuania, and Spain – have commenced universal jurisdiction investigations into war crimes committed by Russians in Ukraine.110 It is much more likely that a trial of a Russian defendant outside Ukraine will occur at the national level rather than at the ICC “because many states that have a civil-law system, such as Lithuania, permit trials [without the defendant present].”111
Conclusion
Unfortunately, the ICC is very limited in its ability to support efforts to prevent further deportations and transfers of Ukrainian children and to retrieve them from Russia. While the arrest warrants for Putin and Lvova-Belova demonstrate the importance of accountability efforts within the conflict between Russia and Ukraine,112 they simply are not enough to produce the desired result. This is due to: (1) the lack of ICC power to enforce the warrants;113 (2) the improbability of Putin or Lvova-Belova traveling to a state that is member to the Rome Statute,114 which would have ability to enforce the warrants; (3) the low likelihood of a member state being willing to arrest Putin and Lvova-Belova, should they travel to one;115 and (4) the ICC’s inability to conduct trials without the accused present.116 Additionally, there is the risk that further ICC action would push Russia to raise the stakes of the war domestically and frustrate any chance of Putin entering into peace negotiations.117 However, the arrest warrants were a good start to holding Russia accountable for the taking of Ukrainian children, as Ukraine has said that they were influential to Russia returning some of the children.118
When offering recommendations on how to address the issue, experts have: emphasized the importance of international organizations and national governments putting international pressure on Russia;119 stressed the need for organizations, such as the European Parliament and the European Union, to build a comprehensive register to document the deported and displaced children;120 suggested that Ukraine create an awareness campaign about the holiday camps;121 and advocated for a backchannel diplomacy that “would use mediators, usually non-western states, neutral non-governmental organizations (NGO), religious and labor, and other groups to bring children back from Russia to Ukraine.”122 Also, national governments placing sanctions on Russia following the issuance of the arrest warrants have been commended by those experts, who have further recommended that those sanctions be expanded beyond their current scope.123 Further, it is not likely that Putin and Lvova-Belova, or other actors involved in the forcible transfer and deportation of Ukrainian children, will be tried by the ICC. However, such a trial is much more likely to occur at the national level pursuant to the principle of universal jurisdiction, as states with civil-law systems permit trials without the defendant present.124 While Ukraine has seemingly prioritized the litigation before the ICC,125 it appears that the most effective actions to end Russia’s forcible transfer and deportation of Ukrainian children are not likely to be taken by the ICC, but instead by national governments and international organizations.126
Endnotes
1 Svetlana Osipova & Systema, Unlawful Transfer: Inside the Russian System to Take Ukraine’s Children, RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty (Jun. 1, 2023), https://www.rferl.org/a/inside-russian-system-taking-ukraine- children/32437567.html.
2 Bill Van Esveld, Investigation Launches into Forcible Transfer of Children in Ukraine, Human Rights Watch (Apr. 6 2023), https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/04/06/investigation-launches-forcible-transfer-children-ukraine.
3 Emma Bubola, Using Adoptions, Russia Turns Ukrainian Children Into Spoils of War, The New York Times (Oct. 22, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/10/22/world/europe/ukraine-children-russia-adoptions.html.
4 Micaela Del Monte & Nefeli Barlaoura, Russia’s War on Ukraine – Forcibly Displaced Ukrainian Children (Apr. 2023), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2023/747093/EPRS_BRI(2023)747093_EN.pdf.
5 Council of Europe, Urgent Action Needed to Reunite Ukrainian Children Transferred to Russia and Russian- occupied Territories with their Families, Commissioner for Human Rights (Jun. 3, 2023), https://www.coe.int/nb/web/commissioner/-/urgent-action-needed-to-reunite-ukrainian-children-transferred-to- russia-and-russian-occupied-territories-with-their-families.6 Osipova & Systema, supra note 1
7 Emma Burrows, Russian Lawmaker Disputes Report Saying He Adopted a Child Taken From a Ukrainian Children’s Home, AP News (Nov. 24, 2023), https://apnews.com/article/ukraine-children-taken-to-russia-war- 4e0478287036191fecb71d0ea4163c95
8 Tara Law, The ICC Has Issued a Warrant for Vladimir Putin. Will He Actually Be Arrested?, Time (Mar. 17, 2023), https://time.com/6264280/vladimir-putin-icc-warrant-arrest/.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Yulia Dysa, Ukraine Says ICC Arrest Warrant for Putin Helped Return Deported Kids, Reuters (Dec. 8, 2023), https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-says-icc-arrest-warrant-putin-helped-return-deported-kids-2023-12- 08/.12 Daphne Psaledakis, US Imposing Sanctions Over Forced Deportation, Transfer of Ukraine Children, Reuters (Aug. 24, 2023), https://www.reuters.com/world/us-imposes-sanctions-over-forced-deportation-transfer-ukrainian- children-2023-08-24.
13 Volodymyr Pylypenko, Transferring of the Ukrainian Children to Russia as Genocidal Act, Cambridge University Press (Jan. 24, 2023), https://www.cambridge.org/core/blog/2023/01/24/transferring-of-the-ukrainian- children-to-russia-as-genocidal-act.
14 Yale School of Public Health, Russia’s Systematic Program for the Re-education and Adoption of Ukraine’s Children, Conflict Observatory Publication Portal Redirection (Feb. 14, 2023), https://hub.conflictobservatory.org/portal/apps/sites/#/home/pages/children-camps-1.
15 Id. at 11.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 12.22Id.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Carlotta Gall & Oleksandr Chubko, The Russians Took Their Children. These Mothers Went and Got Them Back., The New York Times (Apr. 8, 2023), https://www.nytimes.com/2023/04/08/world/europe/ukrainian-children- mothers-russia.html.
27 Id.
28 Del Monte & Barlaoura, supra
29 Id.30 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June 8, 1977 – Part IV, Section III, Article 78
31 Pylypenko, supra note 13.
32 Carlotta Gall, Oleksandr Chubko and Cora Engelbrecht, Ukraine’s Stolen Children, The New York Times (Dec. 27, 2023), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2023/12/26/world/europe/ukraine-war-children-russia.html.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Yale School of Public Health, supra note 14 at 5.37 Gall, Chubko and Engelbrecht, supra note 26.
38 UN Press, Deportation, Treatment of Ukraine’s Children by Russian Federation Take Centre Stage by Many Delegates at Security Council Briefing, United Nations (Aug. 24, 2023), https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15395.doc.htm.
39 Yale School of Public Health, supra note 14 at 14-15.
40 Gall, Chubko and Engelbrecht, supra note 26.
41 UN Press, supra note 38.
42 Id.
43 Gall, Chubko and Engelbrecht, supra note 26.
44 Id.
45 Anastasiia Shvets, Elizaveta Tilna & Sarah El Deeb, How Moscow Grabs Ukrainian Kids and Makes Them Russians, AP News (Mar. 17, 2023), https://apnews.com/article/ukrainian-children-russia- 7493cb22c9086c6293c1ac7986d85ef6.
46Id.
47 Dinara Khalilova, Ombudsman: Putin’s Jan. 4 Decree Will Facilitate Granting Russian Citizenship to Deported Ukrainian Children, The Kyiv Independent (Jan. 6, 2024), https://kyivindependent.com/lubinets-putins-jan-4- decree-will-facilitate-granting-russian-citizenship-to-deported-ukrainian- children/?utm_source=ground.news&utm_medium=referral.
48 Andreas Umland, How and Why Russia Snatches Ukrainian Children, The Moscow Times (Feb. 15, 2024), https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2024/02/15/how-and-why-russia-snatches-ukrainian-children-a84080.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Iryna Marchuk & Aloka Wanigasuriya, The ICC and the Russia-Ukraine War, American Society of International Law (July 5, 2022), https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/26/issue/4.53 Ukraine, International Criminal Court, https://www.icc- cpi.int/situations/ukraine#:~:text=Ukraine%20is%20not%20a%20State,(3)%20of%20the%20Statute.
54 Elements of Crimes, International Criminal Court, https://www.icc- cpi.int/sites/default/files/Publications/Elements-of-Crimes.pdf.
55Id. at 15.
56 Situation in Ukraine: ICC Judges Issue Arrest Warrants Against Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin and Maria Alekseyevna Lvova-Belova, International Criminal Court (Mar. 17, 2023), https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/situation- ukraine-icc-judges-issue-arrest-warrants-against-vladimir-vladimirovich-putin-and.
57 Id.
58 Anushka Patil and Marlise Simons, Daily Briefing: War in Ukraine: International Criminal Court Issues Arrest Warrant for Putin., The New York Times (Mar. 17, 2023), https://www.nytimes.com/live/2023/03/17/world/russia- ukraine-putin-news#the-international-criminal-court-issues-an-arrest-warrant-for-putin.
59 Mark Landler, Arrest Warrant From Criminal Court Pierces Putin’s Aura of Impunity, The New York Times (Mar. 17, 2023), https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/17/world/europe/icc-putin-ukraine-war.html.
60 Lawrence J. Trautman & Maia McFarlin, Putin, Russia and Ukraine: International Human Rights Violations, War Crimes, & Future Implications, SSRN Electronic Journal 36 (Mar. 28, 2023), https://ssrn.com/abstract=4393282.
61Putin to Visit Turkey After Presidential Election in Russia: Kremlin, Turkish Minute (Feb. 26, 2024), https://www.turkishminute.com/2024/02/26/putin-visit-turkey-after-presidential-elections-russia-kremlin/.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Law, supra note 8.
65 Id.
66 Erik Larson, Where Can Putin Travel? How Arrest Warrants for War Crimes Limit Places He Can Visit, Bloomberg (Dec. 5, 2023), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-12-05/where-can-putin-travel-how-icc- arrest-warrant-limits-places-he-can-visit.
67 Rashmin Sagoo & Talita Dias, The ICC Response to Russia’s War Gives Hope for Justice, Chatham House (Mar. 19, 2023), https://www.chathamhouse.org/2023/03/icc-response-russias-war-gives-hope-justice.
68 Dysa, supra note 11.
69Id.
70 Dysa, supra note 11.
71 Sagoo & Dias, supra note 67.
72 Id.
73 Mike Corder, War-crimes Warrant for Putin Could Complicate Ukraine Peace, AP News (Apr. 2, 2023), https://apnews.com/article/putin-arrest-warrant-ukraine-war-crimes-court-93bfa0eb81dd2abe5edb008b78df568d.
74 Id.
75 Andrew Roth, Kremlin Likely to Spin ICC Arrest Warrant as Proof West Wants to Remove Putin, The Guardian (Mar. 17, 2023), https://www.theguardian.com/law/2023/mar/17/vladimir-putin-icc-arrest-warrant-kremlin-russia- spin.76Heather Ashby, Ph.D., Lauren Baillie, & Mary Glantz, Ph.D., How the ICC’s Warrant for Putin Could Impact the Ukraine War, United States Institute of Peace (Mar. 23, 2023), https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/03/how-iccs-warrant-putin-could-impact-ukraine-war.
77 Id.
78 See Ukraine’s Stolen Children (Shahida Tulaganova dir., 2023) (documentary showing how Save Ukraine reunites many Ukrainian mothers with their children by helping them get to the Russian holiday camps where they are located)
79 Anthony Deutsch, Thousands of Ukrainian Children Taken to Belarus – Yale Research, Reuters (Nov. 16, 2023), https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/thousands-ukrainian-children-taken-belarus-yale-research-2023-11-16/#:~:text=Thousands%20of%20Ukrainian%20children%20taken%20to%20Belarus%20%2D%20Yale%20researc h,- By%20Anthony%20Deutsch&text=AMSTERDAM%2C%20Nov%2016%20(Reuters),Yale%20University%20said%20on%20Thursday.
80 Vladyslav Havrylov, Russia’s Mass Abduction of Ukrainian Children May Qualify as Genocide, Atlantic Council (July 27, 2023), https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/russias-mass-abduction-of-ukrainian-children- may-qualify-as-genocide/.81 Laura Kelly, Russia’s Kidnapping Campaign Takes a Crushing Toll on Ukraine, The Hill (Feb. 2, 2024), https://thehill.com/policy/international/4486043-russia-kidnapping-campaign-ukraine-war/.
82 European Parliament, Verbatim Report of Proceedings – Need to Address the Urgent Concerns Surrounding Ukrainian Children Forcibly Deported to Russia (debate), europarl.europa.eu (Mar. 13, 2024), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-9-2024-03-13-ITM-003_EN.html.
83 Nicholas Cecil, UK Hits Russian Officials With Sanctions Over the Forced Deportation of Ukrainian Children, The Standard (July 17, 2023), https://www.standard.co.uk/news/world/ukraine-russia-putin-forced-deportation- sanctions-britain-officials-b1094793.html.
84 Yulia Ioffe & Andreas Umland, Forcible Transfer and Deportation of Ukrainian Children: Responses and Accountability Measures, European Parliament (Nov. 13, 2023), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2024/754442/EXPO_STU(2024)754442_EN.pdf.
85 Id. (quoting Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, Statement in Response to the Russian Federation’s Arria- formula Meeting on the Unlawful Forced Deportation of Children by the Russian Federation in Ukraine (Apr. 5, 2023), https://mfa.gov.ua/en/news/statement-response-russian-federations-arria-formula-meeting-unlawful-forced- deportation-children-russian-federation-ukraine.)86Supra note 84 (quoting U.S. Senate, A Resolution Condemning the Deportation of Children From Ukraine to the Russian Federation and the Forcible Transfer of Children Within Territories of Ukraine That Are Temporarily Occupied by Russian Forces, S.Res. 158 (June 8, 2023), https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/senate- resolution/158/text.
87 Office of the Spokesperson, The United States Joins the International Coalition for the Return of Ukrainian Children, U.S. Department of State (Mar. 7, 2024), https://www.state.gov/the-united-states-joins-the-international- coalition-for-the-return-of-ukrainian-children/.
88 European Parliament, supra note 82.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93Id.
94 Id.
95 Havrylov, supra note 80.
96 Ioffe & Umland, supra note 84.
97 Id at 10-15.
98 Id at 10-11.
99 Id.100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Del Monte & Barlaoura, supra note 4.
105 Ioffe & Umland, supra note 84 at 11.106 Id.
107 Id. at 13.
108 Id.
109 Yulia Ioffe, Forcibly Transferring Ukrainian Children to the Russian Federation: A Genocide? (Sep. 20, 2022), Journal of Genocide Research (Forthcoming), https://ssrn.com/abstract=4236369.
110 Id.
111 Kevin Jon Heller, Can International Law Bring a Measure of Justice to Ukraine?, Russia Matters (Mar. 22, 2023), https://www.russiamatters.org/analysis/can-international-law-bring-measure-justice-ukraine.
112 Atlantic Council experts, Experts React: The International Criminal Court Just Issued an Arrest Warrant for Putin. Will He Wind Up Behind Bars?, Atlantic Council (Mar. 17, 2023), https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/experts-react/experts-react-the-international-criminal-court- just-issued-an-arrest-warrant-for-putin-will-he-wind-up-behind-bars/.113 Law, supra note 8.
114 Id.
115 Trautman & McFarlin, supra note 60.
116 Turkish Minute, supra note 61.
117 Corder, supra note 73; Roth, supra note 75.
118 Dysa, supra note 11.
119 Ioffe & Umland, supra note 84 at 10-11.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id.123 Id.
124 Heller, supra note 111.
125 Ioffe, supra note 109.
126 Id.
